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CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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FEB 2 6 1990 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Re: Larry Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah 
Case No. 890317 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, I wish to advise the Court that the case of State of Utah 
v. Davis, __ Utah Adv. Rep, (Case #890009-CA, Court of 
Appeals, Feb. 12, 1990) may be pertinent to the argument made in 
Issue III (pp. 26-32) and Issue VII (pp. 36-37) of Respondent's 
Brief. A copy is attached for your convenience. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
L. A. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div, 
LAD:gp 
Enclosure 
cc: David Bird 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
David Davis, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890009-CA 
F*\ L E D 
FEB 12 1290 
Weber County, Second District /^./ * *VJ* , \ - ^ 
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde V,,f'^rr'r^ 
Attorneys: Stephen R. McCaughey and Patricia Geary, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant David Davis was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance without the required tax stamps affixed, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 
(1988). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, claiming 
that section 59-19-105 of the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act* is 
unconstitutional. The trial court denied his motion and 
consequently defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest. 
Defendant argues on appeal that (1) the Utah Drug Stamp Tax 
Act violates his privilege against self-incrimination under the 
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution; and (2) the Utah Drug Stamp 
Tax Act is void for vagueness under the fourteenth amendment to 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. We affirm. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-101 to -107 (1988) 
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question 
of law, and thus, we review the trial court's conclusion, that 
the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act is constitutional, for correctness. 
£££ Nephi Citv v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989); Provo 
City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); £££ also 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Furthermore, we recognize that it is the prerogative of the 
legislature to create the law. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 
(Utah 1981). Thus, we afford the legislature's enactments a 
presumption of validity. I£.; Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 
806-07 (Utah 1974); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 
481 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1971). We will not strike down a statute 
unless it appears to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; Pride Club, 481 P.2d at 670. 
Nor will we declare a statute unconstitutional if we can find any 
reasonable basis to bring it within a constitutional framework. 
Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 
P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1952) . 
I. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Defendant contends the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act requires him 
to incriminate himself in violation of the fifth amendment of the 
United States Constitution.2 He asserts that proof he 
purchased and posted the stamps could be used to provide a link 
in the chain of evidence in a subsequent drug prosecution against 
2. Although defendant argues that his rights against 
self-incrimination under article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution were also violated, he does not contend that our 
analysis or the result should be different under the Utah 
Constitution from that under the federal constitution. 
Furthermore, defendant's analytical approach is restricted to 
the fifth amendment. Therefore, we do not address defendant's 
state constitutional claim separately. ££. State v. Webb, 779 
P.2d 1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142 
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
him. Defendant claims that the mere purchase of the stamps is an 
admission of criminal behavior because the law only applies to 
individuals unlawfully in possession of controlled substances.3 
The state argues, on the other hand, that the Utah Drug 
Stamp Tax Act does not require stamp purchasers to identify 
themselves or even to appear in person to pay the tax and obtain 
the stamps.4 Thus, the state claims the tax commission, under 
the Utah statutory scheme, receives no incriminating information 
to disclose to prosecutors. 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the 
government may tax illegal activities. See License Tax Cases, 5 
Wall. 462, 471-73, 18 L. Ed. 497, 501 (1867); Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968). However, the government may not 
establish a method of taxation that violates the fifth 
amendment. !£. at 44. In order to evaluate defendant's claims, 
we first review the scope of protection afforded by the fifth 
amendment and then focus on prior decisions discussing the 
relationship between taxes levied on illegal activities and the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself. . . ." This right arises 
3. In our analysis, we focus on disclosure of the purchaser's 
identity at the time of the purchase of the stamps. Defendant 
did not purchase stamps and thus the issue of whether evidence 
of posting the stamps is incriminating is not before us. See 
Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 572 n.7 (Minn. 1988) (the 
court refused to resolve the possession issue because the 
possession of stamps was not raised by the facts of the case, 
thus the defendant's concern was -purely speculative.-). See 
discussion of standing in Section III. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(3) (1988) provided: 
Payments required by this chapter shall be 
made to the commission on forms provided 
by the commission. Dealers are not 
required to give their name, address, 
Social Security number, or other 
identifying information on the form. The 
commission shall collect all taxes imposed 
under this chapter. 
when the government requests information that will subject a 
person to criminal liability, Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 
648, 655 (1976), and applies to compelled written as well as 
oral testimony. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965); State v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 
769 P.2d 1174, 1179, cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 3254 (1989). 
"The central standard for the privilege's application has been 
whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' 
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of 
incrimination.- Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53 (quoting Rogers v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951)). 
The United States Supreme Court, in defining the scope of 
the privilege's protection, stated: 
The privilege afforded not only extends to 
answers that would in themselves support a 
conviction under a federal criminal 
statute but likewise embraces those which 
furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute the claimant for a 
federal crime. 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). However, 
a defendant may not successfully assert a fifth amendment 
challenge if other protection is granted to him that is broad 
enough to provide the same scope of protection as the 
privilege. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58. 
The United States Supreme Court has focused on the 
privilege against self-incrimination in the context of the 
government's ability to tax illegal conduct in four cases: 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes vt United States, 
390 U.S. 85 (1968); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
In Marchetti, the Court was asked to determine whether a 
federal wagering registration and tax law5 was 
unconstitutional under the fifth amendment. The registration 
provision required taxpayers to register with the Internal 
Revenue Service, providing their names and addresses and, 
additionally, the names of their employees and agents. 
Taxpayers were required to keep daily records showing the 
gross amount of the wagers and permit inspection of their 
5. £££ 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401, 4411, 4412, 6107, 6806(c) (1954). 
books, Id- at 43. The Court noted that each IRS office was 
instructed to "maintain for public inspection a listing of all 
who have paid the occupational tax, and to provide certified 
copies of the listing upon request to any state or local 
prosecuting officer." Id. The law imposed no restrictions on 
the use of the information on the return. Id. at 47. In 
fact, the IRS provided the information to prosecuting 
authorities on a regular basis. Id. at 48. 
The Marchetti Court identified three criteria for 
determining the constitutionality of a tax statute attacked on 
fifth amendment grounds: (1) whether the tax is aimed at 
individuals "inherently suspect of criminal activities,M and 
whether the taxed activity is in an area "permeated with 
criminal statutes," id. at 47 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive 
Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)), (2) whether 
an individual is •'required, on pain of criminal prosecution, 
to provide information which [the individual] might reasonably 
suppose would be available to prosecuting authorities," id. at 
48, (3) whether such information "would surely prove a 
significant 'link in a chain* of evidence tending to establish 
[the individual's] guilt." Id. The Court found the wagering 
registration and tax provisions at issue met the test and thus 
violated the fifth amendment. Id. at 60. 
The government argued in Marchetti, as the state does 
here, that the Supreme Court should read restrictions into the 
statute prohibiting the use of information developed as a 
result of payment of the wagering tax by federal and state 
prosecuting authorities. Id. at 58. This limitation would 
then provide protection broad enough to have the same effect 
as the privilege itself, and render the statutory scheme 
constitutional. The United States Supreme Court found the 
government's suggestion, in principle, attractive, but felt 
precluded from imposing restrictions directly contrary to the 
statutory language providing for disclosure to prosecutors. 
Id. at 59-60. The Court felt it inappropriate because the 
wagering tax system made "quite plain that Congress intended 
information obtained as a consequence of registration and 
payment of the occupational tax to be provided to interested 
prosecuting authorities." Id. at 58-59. 
The United States Supreme Court evaluated a different 
provision of the same wagering tax scheme—a federal excise 
tax on wagering—in Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 
(1968). In addition to the requirements of the wagering tax 
litigated in Marchetti, the wagering excise tax also required 
taxpayers to submit monthly returns detailing their wagering 
activities. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 65. The Court focused in its 
decision on whether the defendant was "obliged, on pain of 
criminal prosecution, to provide information which would 
readily incriminate him, and which he may reasonably expect 
would be provided to prosecuting authorities." Jjfl. at 66-67. 
Based upon a record which substantiated that prosecuting 
authorities had been regularly provided with the information, 
the Court found that "[t]hese hazards of incrimination can 
only be characterized as 'real and appreciable.•* Xfi. at 67 
(quoting Reg, v. Boyes, I B . & S. 311, 330 (1861); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896)). This portion of the 
wagering statute contained no "statutory instruction, as there 
[was] for the occupational tax [in Marchetti!, that state or 
local prosecuting officers be provided listings of those who 
have paid the excise tax." Ifi. at 66. However, the Court 
noted, in upholding a fifth amendment challenge, that "neither 
has Congress imposed explicit restrictions upon the use of 
information obtained as a consequence of payment of the tax." 
Id. The Court also emphasized that the record indicated that 
the IRS had regularly provided prosecuting authorities with 
this incriminating information. Id. 
Again, as in Marchetti, the government urged the Grosso 
Court to interpret the act to prevent prosecuting authorities 
frc using the information disclose:? under the statutory 
scheme and, thus, uphold its constitutionality. 13. at 69. 
The Grosso Court found this approach inappropriate because it 
would lead to the incongruous result that restrictions on 
disclosure and use of information by prosecuting authorities 
would apply to one portion of the wagering tax statutory 
scheme and not another. The Court emphasized that the 
challenged act was "'an integral part' of the same [taxing] 
system" that the Marchetti Court had refused to restrict. Id. 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 60). 
In Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), the 
defendant challenged registration and taxing provisions 
applicable to certain classes of firearms. The firearm 
registration requirement was "directed principally at those 
persons who [had] obtained possession of a firearm without 
complying with the Act's other requirements, and who 
therefore [were] immediately threatened by criminal 
prosecutions . . . • They [were] unmistakably persons 
•inherently suspect of criminal activities.'" 13. at 96 
(quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 
U.S. 70, 79 (1965)). 
Furthermore, the act required a registrant to give his 
name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, place of 
business or employment, whether he had been convicted of a 
felony, and a full description of the firearm and the place 
where the firearm was kept- Id- The Court found the act met 
the Marchetti test, id. at 98-99, and reversed defendant's 
conviction. Id. at 100. Again, the Court refused to avoid 
the constitutional problem by restricting federal and state 
authorities from using the information because the statutory 
scheme explicitly provided for disclosure of the information 
collected to prosecuting authorities. Id. at 99-100. 
Finally, in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the 
United States Supreme Court dealt with a constitutional 
challenge to a portion of the federal Narcotic Drugs Import 
and Export Act6 and the federal Marihuana Tax Act.' This 
legislation was similar to the wagering tax system in that it 
required those paying the tax to register on tax forms, 
listing their names and addresses. Id. at 14. The Court 
found that compliance with the act would create a "real and 
appreciable" hazard of incrimination. Id. at 18. The Court, 
after reviewing the statutory language and legislative 
history, concluded, as it had in Marchetti and Grosso, that 
"the furnishing of information to interested prosecutors was a 
'significant element of Congress' purposes in adopting' the 
statutes" and, thus, refused a construction restricting 
disclosure. Id. at 26. 
We examine the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act under Marchetti to 
determine (1) whether the tax is aimed at individuals 
"inherently suspect of criminal activities," (2) whether an 
individual is "required on pain of criminal prosecution to 
provide information" which he might reasonably think would be 
made available to prosecuting authorities, and (3) whether the 
information would provide "a significant link in a chain of 
evidence tending to establish the individual's guilt." 
6. £££ 21 U.S.C. § 176a(2)(h) (1956) (repealed 1970). 
7. £££ 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-4744 (1954) (repealed 1970). 
Section 59-19-105 provided: 
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, 
transports, or imports into this state 
marihuana or controlled substances, he 
shall permanently affix the official 
indicia on the marihuana or controlled 
substances evidencing the payment of the 
tax required under this chapter. No stamp 
or other official indicia may be used more 
than once. 
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or 
controlled substances by this chapter are 
due and payable immediately upon 
acquisition or possession in this state by 
a dealer. 
(3) Payments required by this chapter 
shall be made to the commission on forms 
provided by the commission. Dealers are 
not required to give their name, address, 
Social Security number, or other 
identifying information on the form. The 
commission shall collect all taxes imposed 
under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1988).8 
The first step of the Marchetti test is clearly met as the 
statute applies only to those dealing in illegal controlled 
substances. 
The second step involves a closer question. The Utah Drug 
Stamp Tax Act, unlike the taxing provisions found defective in 
Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes, and Leary, does not require persons 
purchasing the stamps to disclose their identity. Further, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the identity of 
purchasers has been provided to prosecuting authorities 
historically. See, e.g., Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66. Thus, there 
is substantially less danger that information gathered as a 
result of defendant's compliance with the statute would reach 
prosecuting authorities. We need not decide whether there is 
nevertheless still a "substantial and real" risk that 
defendant's identity would be observed if he purchased the 
stamps and whether there is a real risk this indirect identity 
information would be communicated to law enforcement 
personnel. This is so because, even assuming the second and 
third steps of the Marchetti test were met, we can still save 
Section 59-19-105 was amended in 1989. See note 10, infra 
the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act—as is our duty under Greaves v. 
State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974)—if we interpret the 
statutory scheme to prevent the use of any identity information 
obtained by prosecuting authorities as a result of a person's 
compliance with the act. This protection "• is so broad as to 
have the same extent in scope and effect' as the privilege 
[against self-incrimination] itself." Marchetti. 390 U.S. at 
58 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 
(1892)). Unlike the federal statutes in Marchetti, Grosso, and 
Haynes where a limiting construction was rejected, the Utah 
Drug Stamp Tax Act has no provision providing for disclosure of 
any identifying information to prosecuting authorities.9 
Finally, defendant points to no statutory language or 
legislative history to indicate that the Utah Legislature 
intended the information be disclosed and used by prosecuting 
authorities. Compare Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-59; Grosso, 390 
U.S. at 68; Leary, 395 U.S. at 16. 
We simply cannot say that one of the Utah Legislature's 
objectives in enacting the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act was to 
"facilitate criminal prosecutions based upon information 
obtained from compliance with the statutes." State v. Durrant, 
244 Kan. 522, 769 P.2d 1174, 1182, cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 
3254 (1989). 
In fact, the Utah Legislature has subsequently clarified 
its intention on the issue of the use of identity information 
gained under the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act by its 1989 amendment 
to the Act which explicitly prohibits disclosure and provides 
confidentiality.10 See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 
9. Although there was no explicit provision for disclosure of 
the tax form information under the wagering excise tax in 
Grosso, the United States Supreme Court held it could not 
restrict the disclosure because the wagering excise tax was part 
of the same statutory scheme as the wagering occupational tax, 
which contained a disclosure provision. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 
69. 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1989) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(3) Payments required by this chapter 
shall be made to the commission on forms 
provided by the commission. 
(4) (a) A dealer is not required to give 
his name, address, Social Security 
number, or other identifying 
information on the form. 
(Utah 1988) ("When a statute is amended, the amendment is 
persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed 
the former, unamended statute."); ££_£ also State v. Barnett, 
142 Ariz. 592, 691 P.2d 683, 687 (1984) (subsequent 
legislation, while not controlling, "is a strong indication of 
the legislature's original intent"); Board of County Comm'rs v. 
CMC of Nev., Inc., 99 Nev. 739, 670 P.2d 102, 106 (1983) 
("amendment is persuasive evidence of the purpose and intent of 
the legislature"); Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 
974, 986-87 (Wyo. 1988) (subsequent legislation may be used as 
aid to interpret ambiguous statute). 
Based upon the foregoing, we find the pre-amendment Utah 
Drug Stamp Tax Act can be "found to come within a 
constitutional framework," Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807, by 
construing it to prohibit the use of any information gained as 
a result of a purchaser's compliance with the act to establish 
a link in the chain of evidence in a subsequent drug 
prosecution. As a result of this stricture, we find that the 
(footnote 10 continued) 
(b) The commission or its employees 
may not reveal any facts contained in 
any report, form, or return required 
by this chapter or any information 
obtained from a dealer. 
(c) None of the information contained 
in a report, form, or return or 
otherwise obtained from a dealer in 
connection with this s~ ::.. rr.ay be 
used against the deale_ .:* any 
criminal proceeding unless it is 
independently obtained, except in 
connection with a proceeding 
involving taxes due under this 
chapter from the dealer making the 
return. This subsection supersedes 
any provision to the contrary. 
(d) A person who discloses 
information in violation of this 
subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1989). 
scope of the immunity provided by the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act 
is broad enough to give the same protections provided by the 
fifth amendment and thus uphold its constitutionality.H 
II. VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
Defendant also claims the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act is 
unconstitutionally vague under the due process clauses of the 
federal and Utah constitutions. He argues that even though the 
law states the stamps must be affixed to the controlled 
substances, it does not state where on the package the stamps 
are to be placed. He asserts that the absence of this 
directory instruction results in his being unable to conform 
his conduct to the statute and that it may also result in 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. He points out that 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-104(1) (1988) instructed the tax 
commission to adopt a uniform system for affixing the indicia, 
yet the tax commission has failed to do so. 
11. We note that three states have ruled on the 
constitutionality of drug stamp tax statutes. However, all of 
the statutes considered are similar to Utah's amended statute 
containing provisions on confidentiality and/or a prohibition 
against the use of the information for prosecution purposes. 
£££ State v, Purrant/ 244 Kan. 522, 769 P.2d 1174, certt denied, 
109 S. Ct. 3254 (1989) (Kansas Supreme Court noted taxpayers did 
not have to disclose their identity. 1&. at 1180. But the 
court emphasized that even if the identity of the dealer could 
be ascertained some other way, the statute required that the 
information remain confidential, isJ., and thus concluded that 
the protections included in the statute fell within fifth 
amendment boundaries. Jji. at 1183.); Sisson v. Triplett, 428 
N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1988) (Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished 
the United States Supreme Court cases previously discussed, 
noted that the dealers did not have to submit the form and pay 
the tax in person or reveal their identities, and found that the 
confidentiality provisions in the statute adequately protected 
the defendant from self-incrimination. !£. at 574.); State v. 
Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986) (South Dakota Supreme Court 
found the confidentiality provisions in the statute inadequate. 
The significant difference in Roberts is that while the statute 
purports to protect the dealer with the language, w[s]uch 
prosecution may not, however, be initiated or facilitated by the 
disclosure of confidential information,- another provision of 
the same act allows for the disclosure of the information to 
state and local agencies upon written request. I£. at 690.). 
We find that defendant does not have standing to challenge 
the vagueness of this portion of the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act. 
Utah courts have long held that -before a party may attack the 
constitutionality of a statute he must be adversely affected by 
that very statute. . . . •[T]he court will not listen to an 
objection made as to the constitutionality of an act by parties 
whose rights are not specifically affected.'" Pride Club, Inc. 
v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669, 671 (1971) (quoting 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939)). 
Further, "a person affected by one portion of the statute may 
not plead the invalidity of another portion of the same statute 
not applicable to his case.w Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 
352 (Utah 1979). 
Defendant did not pay the tax and receive the stamps. He 
could not have been confused about where to place those 
stamps. He was not charged with placing the stamps in the 
wrong area of the controlled substance. He was charged with 
the failure to pay the tax and obtain the stamps and, thus, was 
not injured by the provision concerning where to place the 
stamps.12 
12. Even if defendant had standing to assert the vagueness of 
the statute, we would find his claim without merit. In order to 
pass due process muster, statutes must "define a criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does 
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also State v. 
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1050 (Utah 1984); Greaves v, State, 528 
P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974); State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 
P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1952) . 
The law at issue imposes criminal sanctions for failing to 
affix the official indicia to illegal drugs. The criminal 
sanction imposed is not for misplacing the stamps, but for 
failing to affix them at all. The failure to affix the stamps 
to controlled substances is clearly a violation of the law and 
puts all those who deal in controlled substances on notice that 
their failure to place the stamps on the controlled substance 
will result in prosecution. Further, the law is sufficiently 
definite to instruct law enforcement agents where to look for 
the stamps—on the drugs and, thus, they may not arbitrarily or 
discriminatorily enforce the statute as there is no violation if 
the stamps are placed anywhere on the drugs. 
In conclusion, we find the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act does not 
violate the fifth amendment and that defendant does not have 
standing to challenge the act as vague under the due process 
clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions. Thus, we 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
CJdu^JU*^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Gregqcf K. Orme, Judge 
